By: Shaul Arieli

Date: 16.04.2009

For the second time in a decade we're learning that we're "within reach" (according to attorney Gilad Sher) and "a hair's breadth away" (according toformer prime minister Ehud Olmert) from achieving an agreement with the Palestinians. As the Oslo Accords dissolved and after the 2000 Camp David Summit, Ehud Barak hastened to declare that Yasser Arafat was "not a partner". Toward the end of the Annapolis peace process in 2008, Olmert pointed the finger at Palestinian President Mamoud Abbas. Is it true Israeli leaders went very far out of their way to meet the Palestinians, who got cold feet at the moment of truth? Or did Barak and Olmert set out to pressure the Palestinians after they had shown a willingness to compromise on a two-state solution instead of their dream of a "single Palestinian" and the alleged right of return?
Even though the Palestinians' basic positions are supported by resolutions and international law, they proved their willingness to show the flexibility in many areas. They did this to align their positions with Israeli governments' ability to carry out an agreement in light of the settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Arafat might have been able to explain to the Palestinians public why he was willing to forgo the "Palestinian Homeland" and settle for 22 percent of its territory. He could have said the Arab nations were not backing the effort to "correct the historic injustice" that shapes the Palestinian narrative. He might have also cited the international community's stance in recognizing the Jewish nation's right to establish a state in the land of Israel.
All the same, the Palestinians have always viewed an agreement as a package deal: if they concede on one issue, they should be compensated on another. Olmert, like Barak, tried to shatter the formula of total territorial concessions for peace that determined Israel's deals with Egypt and Jordan. He tried to achieve a patial territorial exchange. Olmert offered Abbas 4.5 percent in exchange for the 6 percent that Israel would annex from the West Bank. He claimed that the difference would be covered by the corridor connecting the West Bank to Gaza. Although the corridor's territory would be minuscule and remain under Israeli sovereignty, its contribution to the Palestinian state would be crucial, Olmert claimed.
By contrast, Abbas agreed to a territorial exchange of 2 percent and insisted that the Palestinian Authority retain an area equal to the area of Palestinian lands that Israel occupied in 1967. He regarded the corridor as a natural gesture of flexibility that would complement his own gestures. On the ground, the dispute was about the Ariel bloc, which juts 21 km east of the green line. A concession by Israel on this would produce a bridgeable difference.
Meanwhile, Olmert and Abbas agreed on a partition of East Jerusalem based on parameters set forth by Bill Clinton in 2000. He proposed to keep 200,000 Jews and 14 neighborhoods, which would assume Palestinian sovereignty. The people would lose their status as permanent Israeli residents.
While Abbas stuck with the Clinton proposal, which featured in the Taba talks and Geneva Initiative, Olmert sought a five-year delay in talks on the holy basin, which includes the old city, Mount Zion, the city of David, Kidron valley and the mount of olives. According to Olmert's proposal, during those five years, Israel would remain control of the holy basin while an international committee including Arab states such as Saudi Arabia would participate in law enforcement in the area and make a proposal to be approved by both sides.
On the issue of refugees, the highly-contested "right of return" narrative was set aside in favor of more practical solutions on limited refugee absorption and compensation. Olmert thought absorbing 30,000 refugees over 10 years could get both sides to agree. Abbas sought to increase that number to 100,000.
Security requirements were to be met by banning both heavy weapons and the formation of a Palestinian military. Also, international troops were to be stationed in the PA, with special arrangements on air space and early warning bases.
Arafat rejected the Israeli and American proposals by saying the Palestinians people would reject them. Abbas, in turn, refrained from furthering efforts to bridge the differences when Olmert became a lame duck because of the impending corruption indictments.
Abbas consulted many people, but none would be predict that Olmert would receive the support of Barak and Tzipi Livni should an agreement take shape. Abbas feared losing international legitimacy in the form of UN resolutions 242 and 338 in exchange for an agreement that would be shelved after Abbas had forgone the right of return, leaving Ariel to the Israelis. All this, he feared, would have been done when the Israelis were incapable of carrying out an agreement.
Annapolis and Oslo once again made clear the gap that moderates and pragmatists on both sides can bridge. These processes underscored that what is truly needed is the ability to carry out an agreement.

The writer is a former chief Israeli negotiator with the Palestinians and an architect of the Geneva Initiative.
ched a "dead end" and that Israel intended to present new ideas for diplomacy.