Interview with GI Director-General Gadi Baltiansky, Published in Middle East Bulletin

18.06.09

How would you describe Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speech on Sunday? What were the speech’s strengths? What were its drawbacks?
The speech lasted 25 minutes, 24 of which contained right-wing rhetoric aimed at insulating the one minute non-right wing message. For Netanyahu, talking about a Palestinian state is not an insignificant thing. For the peace process, the speech will be significant if Netanyahu’s policies change along with his words.

It was not a speech of hope or a new message for either Israel or the Palestinians. It was a speech that pointed fingers at the Palestinians and presented Israel as a victim. It was a zero-sum speech rather than a win-win situation.

What in your opinion motivated Netanyahu to support the establishment of a Palestinian state?
Netanyahu explained the reason for his statement on Palestinian statehood when he mentioned the ‘new international situation.’ There is no doubt that if Obama were not the president of the United States, if Netanyahu had not listened to Obama in their meeting in Washington and to Obama’s speech in Cairo, then the prime minister would not have said what he said. Unfortunately, Netanyahu’s motivation to recognize the need for a Palestinian state did not stem from an ideological or perceptional switch; rather it is only a change of position. It is nevertheless praiseworthy.

Netanyahu realized that if he did not join the supporters of Palestinian statehood, he would be left behind with Hamas as the last refuseniks of a two-state solution. The whole world, and most of the Israeli public, understands that there is no other solution but the two-state solution. The significance of the speech is in marginalizing even further the extremists who oppose the concept of a Palestinian state living side-by-side with Israel.

Netanyahu said in his speech: "This policy must take into account the international situation that has recently developed. We must recognize this reality." Can you elaborate further on this new international situation? All the words quoted here can be summed up in one word: Obama. An interesting poll conducted by Hebrew University in Jerusalem before and immediately after Obama’s speech in Cairo showed a significant rise not only in Israeli support for a peace agreement, but also in the belief that such an agreement is indeed viable. That in my opinion is a dramatic change. I am not concerned about the exact percentages of support because once an agreement is signed, most Israelis will support it. But when people believe reaching an agreement is impossible, it creates a self-fulfilling prophecy. Obama’s approach signals both to Israelis and Palestinians that he seriously intends to try to settle this conflict, which in turn makes more people believe that what they support might actually turn into a reality. This belief also influences decision makers to go in the right direction. Thus, Netanyahu cannot ignore the new spirit blowing from Washington and the speech was his way of responding to it; a new reality is being created and Netanyahu cannot be left stuck in the old reality. Metaphorically, the train has left the station. Netanyahu can try to influence its speed, the stops it makes and the final destination but one thing he cannot do is stay on the platform. The speech was his train ticket. Many in Israel interpreted Netanyahu’s use of the term Palestinian state as a price he was willing to pay for dealing with the Iranian threat. Iran was not mentioned in his speech in this context. What’s more, he could not talk about the immediate Iranian threat knowing that two days later—on Tuesday—Mossad head Meir Dagan would tell the Knesset that Israeli intelligence does not anticipate Iran having a nuclear weapon before the end of 2014.

How does Netanyahu’s position on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel compare to previous attempts at defining the final status issues like the Clinton Parameters, Taba and the Geneva Accords?
Netanyahu did not reinvent the wheel in his speech. He tried to express an Israeli consensus and therefore spoke about the Jewish character of Israel and the security issue—the two red lines of most Israelis. Throughout the process thus far—in Camp David, the Clinton Parameters, Taba and Annapolis—it was clear that the Palestinian state would not have a military. The Palestinians themselves are not interested in more than a strong police force, a term coined by Menachem Begin in the first Camp David agreement with reference to Palestinian autonomy.

As for the Jewish character of Israel, there is no doubt that no Israeli leadership would accept the Palestinian demand for the right of return and for a massive return of Palestinian refugees into Israel in a way that would change demographically its Jewish character. This has also been reflected in all the formal negotiations conducted thus far.

Recognition of a Jewish state is a classic issue that will need to be integrated into a final status agreement but it cannot be a precondition. In the only detailed draft which serves as an informal model for an agreement—the Geneva Accord—the Palestinians recognize the right of the Jewish people for a state and Israel as the national homeland of the Jews, while not damaging the rights of its non-Jewish citizens, and Israel recognizes the right of the Palestinians for a state and Palestine as the national homeland of the Palestinians. A distinction should be made between the demand for recognition of the Jewish state and the demand for recognition of the Jewish right for a state within the land of Israel. The demand for recognition of the Jewish state is unreasonable because each state should define its own character, whether it wants to be Jewish, Muslim, Christian, democratic, socialistic etcetera. If Israel wants to define itself as the Jewish Republic of Israel, like the Islamic Republic of Iran, whoever recognizes Israel would also recognize its Jewish character. But only the state can define itself. On the other hand, it is important, in my opinion, that the Palestinians understand and recognize that the Jews are not here accidentally and just as they have rights on their land, we have rights on ours as well. In his speech, Netanyahu did not discern this nuance, and the responses in the Arab world did not make this distinction.

Therefore, I suggest that we stop using the term ‘recognizing Israel as a Jewish state’ but instead talk about a mutual recognition of Israel and Palestine as the homelands of the two peoples respectively.

Despite the internal Israeli debate and the growing demands by the international community and in the United States in particular for Israel to live up to its previous commitments by freezing all settlement growth and removing all illegal outposts, Netanyahu only mentioned that Israel would not build new settlements or expropriate new land for settlements. What does that imply in terms of progress on the issue?
Netanyahu cannot commit to a complete stop to construction beyond the Green Line from two reasons. First, practically it will not happen. Second, once he makes such a statement, his supporters and partners will rise up against him because, as opposed to expressing a stance supporting a Palestinian state, with settlements we are not only talking about words but actions. If Netanyahu indeed promotes the establishment of a Palestinian state, he will anger his partners, but that is still to be seen.

There is also a dual problem with the terminology ‘natural growth.’ First, Israel has been deceiving the world for years—hiding behind the term while settlement expansion was in fact much bigger than any natural growth. Second, stopping ‘natural growth’ sounds unnatural to many Israelis—like asking setters to stop bringing children into the world. I suggest we find another term or take out the word ‘natural.’

Moreover, we should not get confused. A settlement freeze is essential a) to prevent an irreversible situation on the ground; and b) to signal to the other side that we are truly working toward an agreement. Ultimately, however, the most important issue will be dismantling the settlements. The settlements map contradicts the peace map and thus should be changed, not just frozen.

Had the U.S. administration settled for conflict management, a settlement freeze would have been sufficient. While we cannot underestimate the importance of a freeze, if conflict resolution is the U.S. objective—as it signals—ultimately the question is how to not just freeze settlements, but remove them. As the Gaza disengagement showed, evacuating settlements is much easier than freezing construction. Because evacuation is treated as a final status issue, the United States should start the process by laying out its parameters for the endgame.

Finally, the ongoing discussion about outposts strengthens the hands of the settlers because it diverts attention from the real problem. I would like to see all the outposts removed tomorrow morning but if Netanyahu instructs that, does it turn him into a peacemaker? Outposts have nothing to do with peace but are a legal issue. For peace, the settlements map has to be altered.

In terms of what we might see going forward, I don’t think the United States will go back on its resolute and public stance regarding the need for a settlement freeze, and at the same time I don’t believe Netanyahu will publicly accept this stance. This may lead to two alternatives—either the Americans on the ground will have to supervise and approve all construction or they will penalize Israel for continuation of settlement growth. For example, if there is a discussion in the UN Security Council concerning the issue of settlements, how would the United States veto a decision critical of Israel if the United States itself is critical of Israel on that issue?

What might be the impact of the speech on the composition of the governing coalition?
Netanyahu does not have a problem with the current coalition. Since no one thinks a Palestinian state will emerge in coming years, and since he did not change his ideology but only responded to the U.S. position, even the most right-wing members of his coalition don’t see a problem at this stage. They will, however, have a problem if Netanyahu starts negotiating on a permanent status agreement on Jerusalem, for example. And clearly, without such negotiations there won’t be an agreement. I don’t anticipate any shakiness in the coalition in the coming weeks.

Objections to Netanyahu’s speech came from the extreme right and the extreme left. Most of us see the speech as kind of a positive development, more or less meaningful, but nothing dramatic and therefore it won’t cause a dramatic shift in the political system.

Opposition leader Tzipi Livni responded to the speech positively. What are the prospects of her Kadima Party joining the government?
Livni in my opinion responded correctly when she said the speech was a positive step, but one which has to be understood only in terms of Netanyahu’s actions and actual policies. Livni also shares the red lines of most of Israel’s citizens, but she sees reaching a two-state solution as an urgent Israeli national interest. Netanyahu, on the other hand, did not present it as an Israeli interest in his speech nor did he mention the urgency dimension. He presented it as the price Israel has to pay while for Livni it is a condition for the survival and continuation of the Zionist enterprise. Whether she’ll join the government or not will depend Netanyahu’s actions.

How would you gauge the Palestinian response to the speech?
There is no doubt that the Palestinians did not like 99 percent of the speech and that the additional one percent, which addressed their statehood, is a given for them. They did not like the accusations against them, the reference to a united Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the lack of sympathy to their suffering and rights and all the conditions laid out. Still, in my view, their response was wrong because it reacted to the speech rather than to the only sentence which will be remembered in it. Now it’s time to make Netanyahu live up to his words and say ‘now after you agreed on a two-state solution, let’s move forward.’ I hope such a response will be generated on the Palestinians’ part at some point. What’s more, this reaction plays into Netanyahu’s hands because he wants someone else to be blamed for not reaching an agreement. This is what the Israeli right hopes for—that the Palestinians say no and then the world blames them and Israelis don’t blame their own government. I don’t think playing into the Israeli right’s hands is constructive.

In the speech Netanyahu also called for dialog toward peace with all Arab states. Can we expect any progress in terms of the Arab Peace Initiative?
He did not refer to the Arab Peace Initiative and his calls for meetings with Arab leaders sounded like slogans. The price of the Arab Peace Initiative is concessions both toward the Palestinians and the Syrians and he did not even mention Syria or the Golan Heights.
 

What do you foresee as next steps for each of the parties? If I were a young, cynical, arrogant adviser to President Obama I would tell him ‘look what Netanyahu did as prime minister in three months after only one meeting with you and one speech you gave. Imagine what could happen after four meetings and three speeches?’ More seriously, the lesson should be the continuation of and even increase in U.S. involvement. In my view, it will be harder to lead that train I was referring to earlier without defining in advance its destination. I propose that the United States formulates four or five general parameters for a final status agreement—two states based on the 1967 line with border amendments, two capitals in Jerusalem, a solution to the refugee issue based on compensation and return to the state of Palestine, strict security arrangements and integration of the Arab world in a regional peace framework. Then I would outline these parameters in an invitation I would send to all the regional players to participate in an international summit. The players that come to the summit accept these principles as a basis for negotiations while those who don’t come are not willing to serve the interests of the world, the parties themselves and the United States. This way we will know if Hamas is willing to become a legitimate partner in the process, if the Arab world is a partner and what the real policies of Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas are.

Following such a summit, detailed negotiations should start based on the outlines described here. But it is the parties themselves that have to discuss the details without any external parties imposing a detailed agreement on them.
Due to the complexity of the situation and the current players in the Middle East, any meaningful diplomatic act should come from Washington. There is now an agreement between Netanyahu and Abbas on the two-state solution and therefore there is a need to outline the mentioned parameters and, at the same time, make sure reality on the ground changes in a direction that will help advance an agreement. Here both Israeli and Palestinian steps are necessary: to increase movement and access of people and goods, halt settlement construction, establish and improve the institutions of the Palestinian state-to-be, improve the economic situation, fight every form of violence, terrorism and incitement and truly attempt to reach Palestinian unity that will support an agreement.