By Jonathan Wisbey and IPF Staff, 05.09.07

 The Israel Policy Forum
More than a month after it was initially announced, the US-sponsored peace conference tentatively scheduled to take place this November—and the ambiguity surrounding nearly every aspect of it—is still a topic of heated debate.
First proposed in mid-July, the conference is the keystone of a Bush administration initiative designed to take advantage of the situation created in the Palestinian Authority by the Fatah-Hamas unity government’s violent dissolution.  The United States hopes that the conference will provide Israel with an opportunity to reach some form of agreement with Abbas’ moderate Palestinian leadership and reverse the political gains made by Hamas in 2007.
To this end, the conference is set to include the possible participation of several Arab states, most significantly Saudi Arabia.  Regional inclusion is a vital aspect of the proposal.  The attendance of Arab nations will help ensure that the proceedings are accepted as legitimate, while allowing Israel to achieve a breakthrough with those of its Arab neighbors which still have not recognized it. The Saudi presence, in particular, would send a clear signal to Jerusalem of the benefits to be derived by moving on the Palestinian front.
Despite all this, the conference remains more of an abstract notion than an impending reality.  The United States has declined to officially announce what issues will be discussed at the conference, which countries will attend it, or even where and when it will be held.  Predictably, this uncertainty has caused whatever optimism resulted from Bush’s announcement to give way to fear that the conference will soon become another historical footnote.
This is not a good sign.  As Kenneth W. Stein noted in the Jerusalem Post, the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has demonstrated that “detailed pre-negotiations are critical” to creating a successful peace conference.  The United States cannot simply bring Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams together, get them talking and hope to get lucky—luck, as the saying goes, favors the prepared.
Former Deputy Minister of Defense Ephraim Sneh has come out in favor of substantive pre-conference negotiations, and he suggests in the Washington Post that Israeli and Palestinian leaders “should come ready with an agreed-upon list of permanent-status principles that will outline the contours of an agreement.”  According to Sneh, this list—which must, at least abstractly, address the oft-avoided ‘final status’ issues—would establish a framework for negotiations and ensure that progress is made, not lost, during the conference.
Although Sneh believes that an agreement on final status issues should lead to the creation of a Palestinian state, the International Herald Tribune’s Roger Cohen reports that United Nations diplomat Terje Larsen is advocating a different sequence of events.  While Larsen shares Sneh’s belief that Olmert and Abbas should reach an agreement on principles which “go as far as possible,” the veteran diplomat also believes that cynicism is too prevalent in both the Israeli and Palestinian communities for final status negotiations to be successful.  Thus, Larsen proposes that an agreement of principles should be translated straightaway into the establishment of a provisional Palestinian state, and only after statehood should the parties tackle the “nitty-gritty” details of final status negotiations.
The likelihood that the upcoming conference would be the venue for final status negotiations is slim, but reports out of Israel insist that Olmert and Abbas are attempting to reach an understanding on principles.  Although thus far such reports have been clouded in pessimism by indications that Abbas and Olmert have different expectations of how detailed these principles should be, there is reason to be optimistic about the eventual success of these pre-conference negotiations.  As Gadi Baltiansky has written in Yedioth Ahronoth, the political difficulties currently facing Olmert and Abbas can be viewed as “a source of hope” in the context of peace talks.
The unflattering portrayal of Olmert’s leadership presented in the Winograd Commission’s preliminary report on the planning and execution of last summer’s war in Lebanon has damaged Olmert’s public image, while Abbas’ support within the Palestinian community remains in jeopardy following Fatah’s political defeat in the Palestinian elections and its military defeat in Gaza.  Together, these events have created a situation where both leaders are desperate for the popularity which peace – or at least demonstrable progress toward that goal – could bring, and both might have the impetus to get a deal done, if only to prolong their political careers.  As Baltiansky states, Olmert and Abbas “have almost nothing to lose, and we all have much to gain.”
An agreement on principles by itself would be an important springboard to peace, but this benchmark has been made even more essential because of statements by the Saudis that they will only attend the conference provided that “final status” issues are on the agenda.
Former Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben Ami acknowledged the importance of a Saudi presence when he wrote in a recent Yedioth Ahronoth op-ed that “without the participation of the Saudis, Bush's summit will be nothing more than a private party attended by Israel and the Palestinians.”  Ben Ami recognizes that opening diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia would be a valuable incentive for Israel to make progress towards peace, yet he doubts that even the presence of Saudi Arabia would ensure the conference’s success if the region’s radical parties are not included in the talks.
“It’s an illusion to believe that peace can be achieved without the participation of Syria and Hamas,” Ben Ami states, and excluding these parties will only “encourage them to continue in their ‘role’ “ of spoilers. As Ben Ami observes, the conference’s potential success depends largely upon its ability to encourage and reward moderation by the radicals.  It is not possible that Olmert, Abbas, or Bush would accept a meeting attended by representatives of Hamas, but Syria is another story.  Damascus has already stated its willingness to attend the conference, and its presence would place additional pressure on Hamas to accept the meeting’s results while also potentially opening discussions between Syria and Israel regarding Hezbollah.  If the conference is to be more than a PR stunt, progress must be made towards bringing these radical parties into the moderate fold and away from the welcoming arms of Iran. Syrian participation would go a long way towards achieving this goal.
Over the next few months, the fate of the US-sponsored peace conference will be determined.  If Israelis and Palestinians are unable to reach an agreement on principles and the only Arab states to attend are Jordan and Egypt, the conference will likely be forgotten as another well intentioned but poorly conceived attempt to bring both parties together.  However, if the proper preparations take place, the conference could be remembered as an historic prelude to a Palestinian-Israeli settlement, toward an opening with the Syrians, and toward a less volatile Middle East.