By Shaul Arieli, Ha'aretz

13.9.09

The American initiative for Middle East peace, which is expected to be unveiled within the coming weeks, is generating both fear and expectations among the relevant parties. This duality was also felt by Obama administration officials while they were formulating the proposal and deliberating over the right time to publicly present the details.

One of the lessons learned in the 16 years since the signing of the Oslo Accords is that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be likened to a Gordian knot - tangled and lacking a graspable point which could undo it. The failed attempts at untying the knot through interim processes could have moved the Americans to try and solve the stalemate in one fell swoop: present a detailed offer, anchored by a UN Security Council resolution, which would give the two sides a choice to either accept or reject, and to bear the consequences.

Yet putting all the eggs in one basket, similar to what was tried at Camp David, deterred the Americans. They feared the diplomatic process would collapse if the initiative failed, just as it did in the summer of 2000.
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The American dilemma does not deal with the question of whether to work "from the ground up" by way of additional interim agreements, or "from the top down" by way of a detailed proposal and a summit which would consummate the deal.

The lessons of the Annapolis process taught us that it is impossible to make do with Palestinian "state building" without presenting a diplomatic horizon for all issues relating to the establishment of such a state in practice.

On the other hand, it is impossible to make do with negotiations on a final status agreement without supplementing it with significant steps on the ground that will foster an atmosphere conducive to achieving the necessary concessions for such an agreement. The institutional, economic, security and legal mechanisms needed to implement the agreement would also need to be considered.

As such, there are doubts concerning the specificity of the proposal, the timetable for its implementation and the international "anchoring" of the initiative. These doubts come from both directions.

The Americans will not be satisfied with the deal Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is offering - a freeze in settlement construction for a few months in exchange for steps to be taken against Iran - in order to ensure the Arab and European support they need for the sake of their interests elsewhere around the globe.

It is obvious to the Americans that negotiations over vague proposals will drag on for over a year. On the other hand, within a year the Netanyahu government could collapse - thanks to pressure from the settlers and the right wing. Such a development would not be in the Americans' interest today.

As such, what can be expected from the Americans is a regional proposal starting with the Palestinian track and then moving onto Syria and Lebanon. This proposal will be more detailed and specific than the Arab League initiative as it relates to the terms of a deal as well as the benefits included in a permanent status agreement.

The Americans will not be satisfied with the current level of Arab flexibility, which finds expression in their reasonable interpretation of issues relating to borders and refugees, in order to bring Netanyahu to the negotiating table. Yet they also will not deviate from proposing their own solutions to these issues, nor will they wish to place the cart before the horse. In other words, they will not press for full normalization before a final peace agreement.

On the Israeli-Palestinian track, the Americans will seek to create circumstances on the ground which would enable the building of the state-in-the-making. In addition, they will offer their own bridging proposals which will be gradually presented to both sides in the two years allotted for the negotiations. The American proposals will be laid out on the negotiating table through a variety of diplomatic means - ranging from an international peace conference based on the Madrid model, to an exchange of letters based on the Oslo model, to the deposits based on the Syria model, to the detailed parameters for a solution to the conflict based on the Bill Clinton model.

One should hope that the Americans, who were smart enough to adopt the aforementioned "either/or" approach, will refrain from meeting halfway on the key issues, be they a freeze in settlement construction or the right of return.

At Camp David and Taba, we learned that halfway compromises of this nature on each issue individually do not bring the two sides closer, but rather creates a lose-lose situation. The compromise must be aimed at a comprehensive package deal: Israel as the state of the Jewish nation which enjoys security, recognition and peace; and an independent Palestine alongside it.