By Shira Herzog, Globe and Mail

Date: 4.2.2009

TEL AVIV — U.S. envoy George Mitchell left the Middle East last week knowing there was little he could tangibly do until after next week's Israeli election. But he's already signalled a departure from past U.S. pronouncements on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In stating that "the President and the Secretary of State have said that peace and stability in the Middle East are in our national interest ... they are, of course, also in the interest of Israelis and Palestinians," Mr. Mitchell declared that the Obama administration will put its own interests first rather than acting primarily as a facilitator for the two sides. The new Israeli government will face what could be a sea change in the American perception of its historic broker role.

Barack Obama says the U.S. will act aggressively on the Israeli-Palestinian file, but his envoy, whose 2001 report on the outbreak of Palestinian violence spawned George Bush's ill-fated road map to Israeli-Palestinian peace, returns to a far more complicated set of circumstances than he encountered nearly a decade ago.

It's true that the fundamentals haven't changed since the peace process faltered in 2000: Israeli withdrawal from most of the territories occupied since 1967; a non-violent Palestinian state in those areas; an agreed-on resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem; and an agreement on sovereignty in Jerusalem and its holy places. Moreover, the non-governmental Geneva Initiative of 2003 has since created a detailed blueprint for various aspects of this framework, and outgoing Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert recently disclosed how close he and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas came to agreement on several of the key issues in their one-on-one talks.

But the devil has always been in the details of the process, and the volatile lessons of the intervening years point to the need for a new road map to get to the desired endgame.

Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005 demonstrated that unilateral actions are counterproductive absent a binding agreement, accepted by both sides, that's backed by international guarantees and effective monitoring mechanisms. But the Gaza experience also demonstrated that, contrary to constant protestations about the huge political cost of evacuating settlements, Israel is capable of doing so when the political will exists.

Hamas's 2006 election victory and subsequent violent coup in Gaza exposed the illusion of a Palestinian Authority that can speak for all Palestinians. Hamas is a force that can't be ignored despite the military blow it suffered over a month of Israeli attacks. It remains a spoiler aimed at weakening the Fatah leadership and any political process that doesn't acknowledge its power base. With violence as its lever, Hamas effectively controls the outcome of any Israeli-Palestinian talks.

Mr. Mitchell rightly isn't talking to Hamas at present, but the current Israeli policy of embracing the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority while ostracizing Hamas has failed to credibly strengthen the former or decisively weaken the latter. Ultimately, third parties won't be able to determine who governs the Palestinians. The way to stabilize and reconnect the bifurcated West Bank and Gaza may be to tacitly live with the broad Palestinian government that Egypt is now trying to broker.

The deep enmity among Hamas and Fatah may render such a détente impossible and ultimately doom the possibility of an agreement with Israel. But if an understanding is reached, both Israel and the U.S. may have to deal with those who can govern on the ground rather than with those they'd prefer to have as interlocutors.

More broadly, Mr. Mitchell is confronting a changed regional dynamic. Iran looms large with influence and funds over Hamas and Hezbollah. Its potential nuclear capacity is a threat not necessarily because it would be foolish enough to use it against Israel, but because such power would render it an even greater threat to Arab governments such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Finally, it's always been clear that massive international financial backing is necessary for the economic development and viability of a Palestinian state. But the current financial crisis may lead donor governments to re-evaluate investment in what's perceived as a futile process.

Mr. Mitchell's experience in brokering Northern Ireland's Good Friday agreement showed him first-hand the importance of psychology in unravelling such protracted conflicts. Over the past several years, Israelis and Palestinians alike have lost faith in the ability to reach the outcome they know they need.

Next week's Israeli election will reflect a shift to the right against the background of continued rocket attacks from Gaza. Benjamin Netanyahu, who's likely to become prime minister again, says he's not bound by Mr. Olmert's understandings. In this environment, cumulative, step-by-step confidence-building measures of the kind Mr. Mitchell proposed in 2001 would be pointless. Only a comprehensive approach that addresses the local and regional players has any hope of traction.